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This paper studies whether there are differences in fiscal consolidation’s
effect on the distribution of income, depending on a countrys currency regime.
I find that countries under a fixed currency regime experience lower inequal-
ity measured by the Gini coefficient in times of fiscal consolidation when
compared to countries with free floating currencies. Limiting the sample to
fixed countries, consolidation still tends to lower inequality. The effect is only
apparent for small consolidation episodes, larger ones - > 1% of GDP - show
disequalizing effects. Spending cuts and tax hikes both increase the Gini in
floating countries and have equalizing effects in fixed countries. Their size
matters for fixed countries.




As the recent financial crisis unfolded, governments’ standard response to
prevent further dire straits was to increase public spending and thereby sta-
bilize the economy. Expectedly, these spending sprees increased national
debt in the majority of crisis struck countries. Shortly after the most toxic
part of the crises was endured, public belief - fueled by social contracts such
as the ’Maastricht Criteria’ and endorsed by academia1 - was that debt levels
had to be lowered; rather sooner than later.
For a government to lower its debt there are two clear cut alternatives:
Either lower spending or increase taxes. While these measures of fiscal con-
solidation have implications on growth and how a country economically re-
covers, thereby determining the ’economic success’ - and a large strand of
the literature discusses these dynamics in detail - the aftermath of the crisis
also brought about the question of ’cui bono’, who benefits and who looses
income wise in relative and absolute terms. While the literature seems to
have reached consensus that fiscal consolidation, ceteris paribus, increases
income inequality, it is time to get deeper into the discussion and unveil how
different macroeconomic variables interact with fiscal consolidation, thereby
giving policy makers more clear cut advice on how to handle fiscally con-
strained times.
This paper looks at the interplay of exchange rate regimes and fiscal con-
solidation onto the distribution of income. Are there observable differences
for a country under a fixed exchange rate regime vis vis a country with a
1see e.g. the Reinhart-Rogoff Controversy
3
free floating currency? Does the possibility of devaluing a countries’ currency
prior to or during times of fiscal consolidation affect the distribution of in-
come differently? Applying this to the recent consolidation phases following
the economic crisis, are there differences to the distributional consequences
in, say, the Eurozone compared to the US?
Employing a unique dataset on fiscal consolidation episodes in 17 OECD
countries ranging from 1978 to 2009 assembled by Devries et al. (2011), this
paper attempts to shed further light on the issue. It is organized as follows.
Section 2 gives a brief overview on the literature and theoretical aspects
when fiscal policy, exchange rates and the distribution of income interact.
Section 3 outlines the data, gives summary statistics for a general overview
and introduces the applied model. Section 4 presents the regressional results
and section 5 concludes.
2 Literature & Theory
Literature on fiscal consolidation and its effect on income inequality, even if
growing in recent years, still remains scarce. Most of the empirical and the-
oretical work on income inequality has focused on income inequality and its
interplay with growth. Literature on exchange rates and income inequality, to
my knowledge, is close to non-existent, the only contributions trying to assess
exchange rates’ effect on between-country - not within-country - inequality.
This paper will therefore attempt to, for the first time, find empirical con-
nections between these two. As fiscal consolidation is an instrument of fiscal
policy, I will very briefly outline theoretical and empirical discussions on fis-
4
cal policy and its interaction with exchange rates and income inequality. I
will then also briefly outline specific work that focuses on the instrument of
consolidation.
Fiscal Policy and Exchange Rates: For theoretical considerations on
the interplay of fiscal policy and exchange rate regimes a look into your every-
day economics textbook can already prove to be worthwhile: The Mundell-
Fleming Model, amended by the balance of payments - then better known as
the IS-LM-BoP Model2 - gives some theoretical insight. The model predicts
fiscal contractions to be more severe in terms of output for a fixed coun-
try, the rationale being the following: Contractionary fiscal policy decreases
interest rates due to the decrease in aggregate demand. In a flexible ex-
change rate regime, the subsequent outflow of capital leads to a depreciation
of the currency, thereby slowing down the contractionary effects (assuming
the Marshall-Lerner condition3 to hold, theory predicts the contractionary
effect to completely vanish). In a fixed exchange rate regime however, the
currency does not depreciated due to the contraction. Monetary policy pre-
vents the interest rate to fall, thereby a new equilibrium with lower output
is reached while interest rates remain on the same level. As the model only
predicts the notions of GDP (decrease for fixed, stable for floating), interest
rates (decrease for floating, stable for fixed) and exchange rates (decrease for
floating, stable for fixed), the distributional consequences remain in question.
While Karras (2011) finds evidence that fiscal policy is effective under
2Investment - Saving; Liquidity Preference - Money Supply, Balance of Payments
3The Marshall-Lernen Condition states that following a devaluation, an economy’s
balance of payment will only improve if the absolute sum of elasticities of long-term export
and import is larger than one
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both currency regimes and that fiscal policy in fixed exchange rate regimes
tends to be more beneficial - the long run fiscal multiplier being almost a
third larger - the distributional consequences in differing currency regimes
have not been consider by the literature so far. This paper is an attempt
to fill this void and provide some empirical evidence on the distributional
effects of consolidation measures in differing currency regimes.
Exchange rate policies and fiscal consolidation together have been dis-
cussed by Lambertini and Tavares (2003) in the context of finding determi-
nants for the success of fiscal adjustment. They find that successful fiscal
adjustments - defined as the fiscal deficit being zero or negative in the two
years following the adjustment - are typically preceded by large nominal ex-
change rate depreciations.
Fiscal Policy and Income Inequality: Fiscal Policy as a means to
influence income inequality has been investigated by the literature for long.
Especially advanced countries such as the ones I study with the panel at
hand have utilized progressive taxation and redistributive policies to achieve
a more equal distribution of income. Woo et al. (2013) and Heshmati and
Kim (2014) offer surveys on authors studying the general effects of fiscal
policy on income inequality. They all find evidence for an equalizing role
of fiscal policy, where changes in taxation tend to have larger distributive
effects than altering spending patterns.
Discussion on fiscal consolidation’s effect on income inequality has emerged
only recently and is still just a small side branch in the increasingly growing
literature that covers income inequality and its determinants. With the same
panel at hand that I use, Woo et al. (2013), Agnello and Sousa (2014) as
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well as Ball et al. (2013) investigate fiscal consolidation’s effect on income
inequality. They all find income inequality to increase during and after fiscal
consolidation. Woo et al. (2013) and Agnello and Sousa (2014) additionally
find that tax hikes tend to have equalizing effects while spending cuts in-
crease income inequality. In the analysis of Ball et al. (2013), both variables
increase income inequality.
3 Data & Methodology
For the empirical analysis, I focus on using control variables that have already
been discussed in the income inequality literature. I use annual data for a
total of 17 countries 4 over the sample period of 1978 - 2009 which equip my
baseline model with a total of 526 observations that construct an unbalanced
panel.
Dependent Variable: As my income distribution variable I employ
the Gini Coefficient. As a measure of dispersion within an entity/group
ranging from 0 to 1- 0 displaying an equal distribution whereas 1 postulates
maximal inequality, the Gini coefficient is the most comprehensive index for
income inequality and data availability remains highest when compared to
other measures. Further, it is common practice in the empirical literture to
employ the Gini coefficient in inequality analysis.
The data for the Gini was obtained from the Standardized World Income
Inequality Database assembled by Solt (2014). He offers disposable- and
market income inequality data, which I both make use of, as I will elaborate
4Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United States
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Figure 1: Gin Means over sample period
when laying out my methodological approach below. The Gini enters my
regression in logs.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the mean of the Gini coefficient in the
panel at hand, split up into just the fixed countries, the countries with a free
floating currency as well as the mean of the complete sample5. With the
exception of a few decreasing episodes, a clear increasing trend is visible for
the sub-samples and the full sample.
The sample mean starts at 25.9 in 1978 and ends up at 29.9 in 2009. On
5My classification of a free floating and a fixed country can be found below in the
subsection ’Independent Variables’
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average, the countries with a fixed currency show a lower Gini coefficient than
the countries with a free floating currency throughout the sample period. For
the fixed countries the mean throughout the sample period is at 27.74 with
a total of 361 observations, for the free floating countries the mean is at
29.07 with a total of 175 observations. Starting off around the samle level in
the beginning of the 1980s, the Gini means diverged with the fixed country
Gini being lower throughout the sample period. Therefore a negative sign
on the Fixed Dummy can be expected. The appendix further shows mean
and standard deviation of each group as well as the sample.
Independent Variables For control variables, I use a number of macroe-
conomic indicators that have been associated with income inequality. I
closely follow Woo et al. (2013) in their choice of variables to allow com-
parability:
GDP per capita and its squared term: To control for income’s
effect on income inequality and also test for the much discussed Kuznets
hypothesis6, I add GDP per capita as well as its squared term.
Openness: I include an openness variable, measured as Imports + Ex-
ports as a share of GDP, to control for globalization’s impact on inequality.
Most authors studying inequality have used this or an equivalent measure as
a proxy of globalization’s impact on inequality. Santos-Paulino (2012) offers
a thorough survey on evidence how trade may affect income inequality and
poverty. Data for this variable is taken from the OECD.
Education: As earlier papers have found education to be highly associ-
6In his seminal paper, Kuznets (1955) argues that income inequality and per capita
GDP follow an inverse U relationship
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ated with the evolution of inequality, I follow Barro’s (2000) seminal work as
well as Woo et al. (2013), applying the average number of years of secondary
schooling as my education variable.
The Barro and Lee (2013) dataset offers the most comprehensive source
of educational data, yet they provide figures in 5-year intervals. To be able
to include education as a control variable without loosing too many observa-
tions, I regressed education onto a time variable and a squared term of the
time variable and then took the fitted values as my education variable. This
allows for yearly observations while holding the errors to a minimum. The
average fit over all countries within the panel is at R2 = 0.975.
General government debt as a share of GDP: Since Consolidation
measures become apparent once a country runs too high a level of debt, I
add government debt as a share of GDP as a control variable. Data is taken
from the OECD.
Currency Regime: To identify a country as being either pegged or free
floating, I made use of the database assembled by Ilzetzki, Reinhart and
Rogoff (2010), who offer an extensive overview over currency regimes. In
their coarse database they sort a total of 201 countries over a time span of
up to 70 years into one of five categories. 7 Categorizing the countries ended
in a total of 369 episodes with pegs and 1758 episodes without pegs. In this
7The categories used by Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff are: No separate legal tender,
crawling peg, crawling band that is within ’+/- 2% and +/- 5%’, free floating, and free
falling. To construct my dummy variable that takes the value 1 when a country is pegged
and 0 otherwise, I classified no separate legal tender, crawaling peg and crawling band
that is within +/- 2% and +/- 5% as a peg, and free floating and free falling as no peg.
8Countries that remain free floating throughout the observation period are Great
Britain, Japan, the United States and Sweden. Australia remains free floating for 17
years
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paper I am referring to countries that fall under my ’pegged’ definition as
either pegged or fixed countries, while the second group I refer to as floating
or unpegged countries.
Consolidation Episodes: I use the action-based dataset assembled by
Devries et al. (2011) to identify episodes of fiscal consolidation. Unlike
prior studies on fiscal consolidation that for identification of consolidation
episodes looked at increases of the cyclically-adjusted primary budget bal-
ance (CAPB), Devries et al. (2011) use a historical approach. According to
the authors, the CAPB approach runs the risk of (i) ”capturing measurement
errors that are likely to be correlated with economic development” and, (ii)
changes in fiscal policy ”can be motivated by a desire to respond to cycli-
cal fluctuations, raising reverse causality concerns”. Therefore, Devries et
al. (2011) analyzed policy documents such as central bank reports, budget
reports or budget speeches to get a grip on policy makers’ intentions. Based
on these sources the authors set up a database covering the above-mentioned
17 countries over the time span of 1978 to 2009 with a total of 173 annual
consolidation episodes, split into tax hikes and spending cuts. The initial
database offers the size as a share of GDP of each consolidation episode.
Consolidaton/Currency Interaction Term: To get a closer look on
consolidation periods in differing currency regimes, I construct an interaction
term of the currency regime dummy and consolidation dummy which takes
the value 1 when consolidation occurred and 0 otherwise. This interaction
term will allow to see whether there are differences in the Gini of consoli-
dating and fixed countries, compared to the complete sample. The pairing
of Consolidation and the Fixed Dummy results in a total of 120 interaction
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Table 1: Control Mean
Statistic 1978-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009
GDP per capita Pegged 21591 28790 35852
GDP per capita Floating 22240 31596 37972
Education Pegged 2.46 3.40 4.16
Education Floating 2.94 4.32 4.81
Opennes Pegged 58.12 72.25 87.60
Openness Floating 36.47 38.10 48.60
Central Government Debt/GDP Pegged 51.93 72.88 68.82
Central Government Debt/GDP Floating 45.40 60.37 57.88
term dummies.
Table 1 presents means of the control variables split into floating currency
regime countries or episodes, and for their pegged counterparts for the pe-
riods 1978-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2009. On average, countries with free
floating currencies experience a higher GDP per capita, higher government
debt in relation to GDP and more years of secondary schooling throughout
the sample period. Interestingly however, countries with pegged currencies
seem to be more prone to trade.
Gini Pre and Post Consolidation Levels: As a first step in my
analysis I merely look at the development of the Gini prior to and following
a consolidation phase in both pegged and free floating countries. To identify
periods of consolidation more clearly and to see actual changes within the
Gini, I did not take the mean of each consolidation year in the sample, I
rather identified periods of consolidation and then observed what happened
prior and following these periods. Perotti (2011) discusses how analysis can
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differ depending on how such a period is defined. I define a consolidation
period to end if there are two consecutive year without a tax hike or spending
cut following the last consolidation year.
This leaves me with a total of 36 observations. Figure 1 displays the
mean of the according Gini for both pegged and floating countries 1, 2, 4,
5 and 8 years before and after. For the case of the floating countries, a
general increasing trend can be observed which may be due to the general
increase seen in the Gini coefficient as discussed above. Still, there is a clear
increase of the coefficient from a year before to a year after the consolidation
phase, namely from 27.78 to 29.31. The Gini then remains at this level and
continues growing which could point to persistence in the increase following
the consolidation period. Another line of reasoning in this could be my choice
of consolidation episodes, as I look at Gini coefficients before and after the
consolidation: According to this definition, consolidation episodes last up to
14 years in the sample at hand. Therefore, my calculation method could
capture some of the general increase in the Gini.
In the case of the pegged countries, the increase right after the consoli-
dation period is visible, yet much smaller in size, from 27.08 to 27.60. Here
the jump in the coefficient does not seem as persistent, 4 years following the
consolidation period the coefficient falls even below pre-consolidation levels.
As an additional comparison, Figure 2 displays the cumulative Gini co-
efficient of 4 years before and 4 years after the consolidation period, once
again split up in fixed and floating countries and showing the complete sam-
ple. While in the countries with a floating currency an increase by about
1.48 from an average of 27.87 to 29.35 is observable, fixed countries show
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Figure 2: Gin Pre/Post Consolidation split into Fixed And Floating
a different behavior. The average Gini here declines by about 0.16 from
27.26 to 26.10. This could already point to differing signs of the consolida-
tion*pegged dummies in the regression below. The complete sample, driven
by the floating countries, increases by 0.20 from 27.41 to 27.61.
Simple summary statistics therefore show an increase of Ginis in the year
following consolidation episodes in both sub-samples, yet when summing
up the previous and following 4 years of consolidation episodes, the picture
differs for fixed and flexible countries. As these findings include all sorts of
effects, I will employ an econometric model to attempt to disentangle them
and get a clearer picture on what happens to the income distribution due to
fiscal consolidations in countries with different currency regimes.
Econometric Model: For my econometric analysis I will make use of
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Figure 3: Cumulative Gini 4 years Pre/Post Consolidation
two models. First I will run a two-way fixed-effects (FE) regression9 with
standard errors with up to 3 lags introduced by Driscoll and Kraay (1998).
Panel data may show patterns of herd behavior and neighborhood effects,
which in my panel with rich and well-connected OECD countries may be
apparent. The Driscoll and Kraay standard errors account for this and show
robustness to general forms of temporal and cross-sectional dependance. The
FE model allows for an unobserved, time-invariant country specific variable.
In my case, this could be interpreted as cultural preference towards income
inequality, which may differ on a cross-country level. The employment of
a fixed effect model will control for this effect so I don’t run into an omit-
ted variable bias. Since the panel at hand is a rather homogeneous group
of countries, I additionally include a time-specific effect to capture factors
displaying the ’zeitgeist’ on a more global level. Formally, the model is:
9with p=0.0001, the Hausman test pointed to the use of FE
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Git = β0Xi,t−1 + β1Di,t + αi + θt + γit (1)
where G denotes the Gini coefficient, Xi,t−1 is the set of control variables
discussed above, αi denotes the country-specific fixed effect, θt the year-
specific effect, D is the set of dummy variables I want to look at more closely
and γit denotes the error terms. I assume the variables to take a year until
they affect the Gini coefficient, therefore they enter the equation with a one-
period lag.
Since Solt (2014) does not only offer Gini coefficients on disposable in-
come but also on market income, I additionally run a seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) introduced by Zellner (1962) and expanded by Biorn (2004)
into the context of unbalanced panel sets to verify the results from the FE
model. The SUR estimates a system of equations, in this case one equation
for the disposable income inequality and one for market income inequality
that could otherwise be estimated independently. The SUR however allows
the error terms of the regressions to be correlated, thereby increasing ef-
ficiency of the regressors. As the seemingly unrelated regression will have
no gain in efficiency over OLS if both equations contain the exact same re-
gressors, I assume the consolidation variable to have no effect on the market
Gini. The timing of the variables remains as in the FE specification described
above. I equip the SUR model with time-fixed and country-fixed effects.
The formal representation remains similar to (1) yet G now is a vector
with G = (Ggross, Gnet)′ as the variables for income inequality. The control
variables will become X = (Xgross, Xnet)′. D remains the set of dummy
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variables and only enters the net regression for the reasons stated above.
4 Regression Results
Columns 1-3 of Table 2 shows the regression results of the two-way FE re-
gression. Columns 6 and 7 show the outputs for the SUR regression. The
outcome for the market Gini regression of the SUR is in the appendix.
While the magnitudes and significance levels of the control variables differ
between the two employed models10 they mostly remain the same size when
changing the dummies. The SUR generally confirms the findings of the FE
model. The signs of control variables and dummies are similar throughout
both models. GDP per capita is highly significantly associated with a gen-
eral increase of the Gini coefficient, yet, as the squared term shows, only to
a certain extent. Hence, my results confirm the presence of the above men-
tioned Kuznets-Relationship11. Education is associated with a lower Gini
coefficient in both models. Globalization comes up as significantly associ-
ated with a lower Gini coefficient.
The consolidation dummy itself comes up positive. Consolidation to in-
crease the Gini coefficient is in line with the authors mentioned above. Ex-
pectedly due to the lower mean, a fixed country is associated with a lower
Gini coefficient, yet the coefficient remains insignificant. Interestingly, the
consolidation/fixed currency country interaction dummy comes up with a
negative sign in both models, and even significant to a 5% level in the SUR.
This negative sign remains even when the sample is limited to just pegged
10while highly significant in the SUR, education comes up insignificant in the FE
11According to the output, the decreasing effect starts around 37.000 $ per capita.
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countries or just consolidation phases. The negative sign also remains when
the model is estimated with both, the dummy controlling for fixed countries
and the consolidation dummy to rule out the generally lower Gini coefficient
of the pegged countries to oversize the consolidation effect12. The results
therefore show that countries that are pegged and consolidate are associated
with a lower Gini coefficient compared to (i) the complete panel at hand,
(ii) countries that are consolidating and (iii) pegged countries in general.
Countries with free floating currencies experience the exact opposite. Even
if statistically insignificant, consolidation phases increase the Gini coefficient.
The regression output is relatively robust to the inclusion of additional con-
trol variables such as unemployment, inflation or GDP growth. While the
magnitudes and significances slightly differ, the signs remain the same. Out-
puts of the robustness checks are in the appendix. Even without explicitly
implying causality, these results point to a difference in the distributional
consequences of consolidation measures in pegged and free floating coun-
tries. One interpretation for this occurrence could be that the ability to
devalue the currency puts pressure on wages earned in the exporting sector.
The additional increase in prices for imports may increase pressure on lower
incomes if a large share of basic consumption goods are imported. For the
economy as a whole, that may be beneficial as Lambertini and Tavares (2003)
have showed, yet in distributional terms this may result in higher inequality.
12regression output for the limited sample and the regression with both peg and consol-
idation dummy can be found in the appendix
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Table 2: Gini, Fiscal Consolidation, Exchange Rate Regime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FE FE FE FE FE SUR SUR
LogGDPt−1 3.317
∗∗∗ 3.388∗∗∗ 3.351∗∗∗ 3.266∗∗∗ 3.278∗∗∗ 3.589∗∗∗ 3.754∗∗∗
(6.39) (6.32) (6.40) (6.43) (6.44) (5.53) (5.76)
LogGDP2t−1 -0.184
∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗
(-6.48) (-6.40) (-6.50) (-6.51) (-6.58) (-5.74) (-5.96)
Educationt−1 -0.00965 -0.00949 -0.00960 -0.0112 -0.0117 -0.0652
∗∗∗ -0.0671∗∗∗
(-0.91) (-0.89) (-0.90) (-1.04) (-1.08) (-8.15) (-8.25)
Opennesst−1 -0.00269
∗∗∗ -0.00263∗∗∗ -0.00273∗∗∗ -0.00266∗∗∗ -0.00267∗∗∗ -0.00151∗∗∗ -0.00149∗∗∗
(-6.96) (-7.73) (-6.96) (-7.26) (-7.61) (-7.92) (-7.83)
Debt/GDPt−1 -0.0000917 -0.0000713 -0.0000816 -0.0000741 -0.0000664 -0.000302 -0.000315





Cons ∗ Pegt−1 -0.00457 -0.0233∗
(-0.36) (-1.70)
Consolidation < 1%t−1 0.0142
(1.50)
Consolidation >= 1%t−1 0.0105
(0.93)
Consolidation < 1% ∗ Pegt−1 -0.0194 -0.0156
(-1.49) (-0.99)
Consolidation >= 1% ∗ Pegt−1 0.0102 0.0539∗
(0.59) (2.53)
N 526 526 526 526 526 526 526
t statistics in parentheses, Dependent Variable is the Log of Gini, Market output of SUR in appendix
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3: Gini, Tax Hikes & Spending Cuts, Exchange Rate Regime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE SUR SUR SUR
LogGDPt−1 3.293
∗∗∗ 3.348∗∗∗ 3.314∗∗∗ 3.380∗∗∗ 3.617∗∗∗ 3.602∗∗∗
(6.40) (6.87) (6.43) (6.55) (5.16) (5.13)
LogGDP2t−1 -0.183
∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗
(-6.50) (-6.93) (-6.52) (-6.64) (-5.33) (-5.30)
Educationt−1 -0.0110 -0.00951 -0.0108 -0.00900 -0.0656
∗∗∗ -0.0661∗∗∗
(-1.04) (-0.91) (-1.02) (-0.84) (-8.04) (-8.16)
Opennesst−1 -0.00267
∗∗∗ -0.00271∗∗∗ -0.00269∗∗∗ -0.00272∗∗∗ -0.00156∗∗∗ -0.00156∗∗∗
(-7.10) (-7.62) (-7.11) (-7.80) (-7.94) (-7.93)
Debt/GDPt−1 -0.000102 -0.0000842 -0.000101 -0.0000660 -0.000395 -0.000389
(-0.70) (-0.55) (-0.69) (-0.47) (-1.83) (-1.80)
TaxDummyt−1 0.00654
(0.82)




SpendDummy ∗ Pegt−1 -0.00990 -0.00945
(-0.81) (-0.60)
N 525 526 525 526 515 515
t statistics in parentheses, Dependent Variable is the Log of Gini, Market output of SUR in appendix
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Therefore, as the summary statistics showed how countries with currency
pegs are more prone to trade, the peg may be a good ’defense’ mechanism for
distributional issues. There could be merit in examining countries just prior
to consolidation phases and look at the distributional consequences in case
of a devaluation, appreciation or if monetary policy takes no action while
controlling for price effects on basic living goods that are imported. A closer
examination of the consolidation measures taken by each country group could
be of interest as well. Spending cuts social security transfers have different
distributional implications as cuts in, say, expenditures for cultural events.
The same holds for tax hikes, where value added taxes tend to hurt lower
incomes to a higher degree than property taxes.
Agnello and Sousa (2014) additionally find that the size of the consol-
idation episode measured as the share of GDP which the spending cut or
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Table 4: Spending Cuts and Tax Hikes split into small and large
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE SUR SUR
LogGDPt−1 3.208
∗∗∗ 3.230∗∗∗ 3.424∗∗∗ 3.616∗∗∗
(6.28) (6.25) (5.24) (5.52)
LogGDP2t−1 -0.178
∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗
(-6.35) (-6.35) (-5.44) (-5.73)
Educationt−1 -0.0118 -0.0120 -0.0661
∗∗∗ -0.0675∗∗∗
(-1.10) (-1.10) (-8.10) (-8.37)
Opennesst−1 -0.00266
∗∗∗ -0.00270∗∗∗ -0.00153∗∗∗ -0.00152∗∗∗
(-7.57) (-7.71) (-7.97) (-7.97)
Debt/GDPt−1 -0.0000736 -0.0000690 -0.000274 -0.000273
(-0.52) (-0.50) (-1.34) (-1.33)
TaxDummy < 1%t−1 0.0125 0.0198
(0.82) (0.67)
TaxDummy >= 1%t−1 0.0232 0.0131
(1.93) (0.38)
SpendDummy < 1%t−1 0.0219 0.00656
(-1.29) (0.23)
SpendDummy >= 1%t−1 0.000585 0.00111
(-0.05) (0.04)
TaxDummy < 1% ∗ Pegt−1 -0.0161 -0.0254
(-0.85) (-0.79)
TaxDummy >= 1% ∗ Pegt−1 0.0172 0.0163
(0.79) (0.32)
SpendDummy < 1% ∗ Pegt−1 -0.0337 -0.00797
(-1.53) (-0.25)
SpendDummy >= 1% ∗ Pegt−1 0.000817 0.0272
(0.04) (0.57)
N 525 525 525 525
t statistics in parentheses, Dependent Variable is the Log of Gini
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
tax hike amounts to, has differing effects on inequality. In their analysis,
consolidations that excel 1% of GDP are less detrimental for the distribution
of incomes than those lower than 1%, yet both remain inequality increasing.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 show the result for these additionally dum-
mies. Average consolidation within the panel is 0.25 % of GDP, for pegged
countries it is 0.22% and for floating countries it is at 0.31%. Rather
unsurprisingly, dummies for ’small’ and ’large’ consolidation episodes both
come up positive. Unlike in Agnello and Sousa’s (2014) analysis their size
does not differ dramatically - yet ’small’ consolidation episodes are associated
with larger increases than ’large’ episodes. Both interaction terms show a
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different pattern. The ’small’ consolidation episodes in interaction with the
peg dummy are associated with lower inequality, while the ’large’ episode
have inequality increasing effects. When constructing a dummy for the non-
pegged countries and pairing it with a dummy controlling for small or large
consolidation episodes, both come up positive.
As the dataset assembled by Devries et al. (2011) differs between spend-
ing cuts and tax hikes, this allows for differentiation between these two con-
solidation measures as well as their different effects in different currency
regimes.
Table 3 displays the output of the regression with this differentiation.
The control variables remain in a similar magnitude with similar significances
and signs compared to the previous regression. Both, the tax hike and the
spending cut dummy, come up with a positive sign in the FE regression.
The tax dummy is about 4 times as large in magnitude however, yet both
dummies are insignificant.
The interaction term of both dummies comes up negative in both the FE
and the SUR model. While the FE regression finds the spending dummy to
have almost twice the size of the tax dummy, the size barely differs in the
SUR regression13. Table 4 splits the tax and spending dummy into ’large’
and ’small’ consolidation phases and pairs it with the fixed dummy once
more. Both models come up with the same signs yet differing sizes and
significances again. While both sizes of tax hikes are inequality increasing in
13The negative sign of both interaction terms prevails if the sample is limited to include
just currency-fixed countries or controlling for fixed countries when the sample is limited
to just consolidation episodes. Limiting the sample to just countries with free floating
currencies, both spending hikes and taxes cuts increase inequality, tax hikes even with a
10 % significance in the FE model. Outputs can be found in the appendix.
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the complete sample (large tax cuts having almost twice the effect), small tax
hikes have equalizing effects for the pegged countries. The same pattern holds
for spending cuts: Both have disequalizing effects in the complete sample and
an equalizing effect for small cuts in the pegged countries.
5 Conclusion
My analysis mostly confirms the findings of previous authors that episodes
of fiscal consolidation increase income inequality, all of the employed dummy
variables controlling for these phases come up insignificant however. When
differing between spending cuts and tax hikes, the disequalizing effect for
both variables remains, the effect of tax cuts is almost six times as large
however. Extending this work, I find that there is a difference when compar-
ing countries under a fixed and a floating currency regime. Countries under
a fixed currency regime tend to be able to lower their income inequality mea-
sured by the Gini coefficient in times of fiscal consolidation when compared
to (i) the complete sample, (ii) pegged countries, and (iii) consolidating coun-
tries. Countries with free floating currencies however tend to be associated
with an increase in inequality due to consolidation when compared to either
group. The difference in both groups remains when splitting between tax
hikes and spending cuts. While both consolidation measures have an equal-
izing effect for fixed countries, they show a disequalizing effect for floating
countries.The size of the consolidation seems to matter as well. For consol-
idation packages larger than 1% of GDP, even fixed countries experience an
increase in income inequality. Consolidation measures below 1% remain an
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equalizing effect. The composition of the consolidation has differing effects
as well. ’Small’ tax hikes and spending cuts have equalizing effects in fixed
countries, while ’large’ ones have disequalizing effects. For floating countries
both show disequalizing patterns. There could be merit in closer exploring
the dynamics within floating countries. While the peg may work as a sort of
defense mechanism for the distribution of incomes, a closer look at the effects
of appreciation or depreciation prior to or during times of fiscal consolidation
- while having an eye on a country’s exposure to international trade and the
consumption of imported goods - and their effects on the income distribu-
tion could be worthwhile and help to understand what kind of changes to the
exchange rate are beneficial or detrimental for the distribution of incomes.
A closer look at the dataset made available by Devries et al. (2011) could
be of interest as well. Understanding which exact spending cuts or tax hikes
have what implications on the distribution, and which composition may be
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